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A Conversation between Evelyne 
Grossman & Jacob Rogozinski 
Deleuze, reader of Artaud—Artaud, reader of Deleuze 
Evelyne Grossman & Jacob Rogozinski 
 
JACOB ROGOZINSKI: Each time that I re-read Deleuze, I feel immense 
admiration, gratitude, and, at the same time, a certain hesitation. I have 
wondered for a long time why I resisted him. I am beginning to understand 
why I am not a “Deleuzian,” and my work on Artaud is helping me to see this 
more clearly. Thanks to Deleuze (and some others, notably Derrida), we have 
learned to really read Artaud, so that we can grasp the force of his thought, of 
his writing. But the readings that are the most illuminating can also be the 
most blinding: this is the case for Heidegger’s interpretation of Hölderlin, and 
for Deleuze’s interpretation of Artaud. It seems to occupy a marginal place in 
his work: only a few pages, nothing like the long analyses devoted to Proust 
and Kafka. It is there, however, where Deleuze discovers the motif of the 
“body without organs,” which will play such a great role in his philosophy; it 
is also with Artaud that his interest in schizophrenia begins. However, except 
for Logic of Sense, Deleuze’s reading of Artaud remains superficial. It is more 
often limited to an incantatory invocation: the Momo would be the most 
exemplary incarnation of radical poetry, the Christ of the poets in a way, in 
the sense that Spinoza is “the Christ of the philosophers”… Deleuze created a 
myth, that of Artaud the Schizo, who would have been “the accomplishment 
of literature, precisely because he is schizophrenic,” who would have 
succeeded by virtue of his “psychosis” which dissolved his subjectivity in an 
anonymous flow of desire.1 I think that Deleuze departs from the actual 
experience of Artaud on two decisive points: by his praise of madness as a 
resource for writing, and by his apology for the destruction of the ego. Why is 
this a misunderstanding? 
The experience of madness coincides well, in Artaud, with a de-
subjectivization, where his personal identity seems to disappear, where he no 
longer is able to write his own name. But it is above all the test of a disaster: 
Artaud was not a genius poet because he was crazy, even though he was, and 
his return to writing is the story of an “escape from hell,” a fight against 
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madness. He did not write so many admirable texts because his 
“schizophrenia” would have fortunately relieved him of the illusory necessity 
of having to be a me, only for him to reappropriate his me, his name, his body, 
in order to make them reborn in ripping them out of this dark pocket where 
they had fallen. Contrary to a romantic apology for the delirium, he must stick 
to the maxim of Foucault: madness is the absence of the work, the point of 
collapse where it becomes impossible. Which does not mean that it has nothing 
to do with the work. As is the case with so many great artists, the work 
happens only in a fierce struggle with the emptiness that feeds, the silence 
which threatens to interrupt. Whether we are considering Hölderlin, 
Nietzsche, or Artaud, it is that we can only do work at the limit of madness, in 
trying to resist it, to escape from this ground where art and thought draw their 
force, but still risk sinking. 
 
EVELYNE GROSSMAN : There is not, I believe, a praise of madness in 
Deleuze, but a praise of delirium, which is quite different. He understands the 
word in the well-known etymological sense: what comes out of the furrows, 
out of the straight line. Therefore, he praises curves, spirals, or those forces 
which divert the discourse of ordinary law to an outside that overflows. The 
literature is delirious, it is often repeated, cosmic delirium which haunted the 
universal story, which has nothing to do with our stories of father-mother—
these little, banally oedipal stories. In this sense, there is a profound 
complicity between the discourse of Deleuze and Guattari and some of the 
great writings of the end of the nineteenth and of the twentieth century which 
they interrogate: Proust, Beckett, Blanchot, Artaud, Céline, Kafka, Anglo-
American writers, etc. All, according to him, are deeply delirious—and 
Deleuze too, with Guattari, in a certain sense, endeavors to make 
philosophical discourse delirious. They did it, as we know, with Anti-Oedipus 
and A Thousand Plateaus, books which remain to my mind inexhaustible 
works of creation. 
So for him, without the delirium which invents the processes, the 
encounters, the events, it is not a creation. This by no means signifies a praise 
of psychosis; the “schizo” of which he speaks does not meet the psychiatric or 
institutional definition of the term. It is a conceptual personage, a quasi-
romanesque creation; he is a Beckettian tramp wandering on the routes of 
Lawrence’s nomads. “You do not write with your neuroses,” says Deleuze. 
“The neuroses, the psychosis, is not the way through, but the states in which 
one falls when the process is interrupted, prevented, clogged. The malady is 
not the process, but halts the process, like in the ‘case of Nietzsche.’”2 Note 
that he does not say the “case of Artaud,” no doubt because he knows better 
than anyone how Artaud was never “fixed,” as psychiatrists say. 
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In this sense, Artaud is interesting when he is delirious, like any great 
writer, and not when he collapses in psychosis. Deleuze has this astonishing 
formula in Logic of Sense when he refers to certain translations that Artaud 
made of Lewis Carroll in 1944 during his internment in the psychiatric asylum 
of Rodez: he speaks of Artaud as “a collapse central and creative.” Deleuze’s 
paradoxical formula speaks the complexity of the phenomena—complexity 
which, in his indisputable honesty, he does not seek to reduce. He considers 
a surprising trio whose elements he pivots (he is still structuralist at the time): 
Lewis Carroll (the experimental poet of the paradoxes of sense), Louis 
Wolfson (the schizo), and Antonin Artaud. Artaud: poet or schizo? He 
compares the surfaces of Carroll to the depths of Artaud, and analyzes the 
language of Artaud compared to that of Wolfson. “Far from Artaud’s genius, 
he writes curiously about Wolfson’s prose, considering another text whose 
beauty and density remain clinical.”3 There is beauty in the schizo language, 
but is it relevant to psychiatry? According to what discriminating criteria? 
Deleuze does not say. “For all of Carroll,” he concludes, “we would not give 
up one page of Antonin Artaud.”4 
 
J. ROGOZINSKI : My concern is how you demarcate between madness and 
delirium, between the schizo in the Deleuzian sense and in the psychiatric 
sense of the term. If any writer, any speech which deviates from the norm is 
“delirious,” then the word delirium loses its meaning. And can we entirely 
dissociate the concept of “schizophrenia” from its context, from its history—
that is of the field of psychiatry—where it was elaborated? I believe that, in 
Deleuze, these distinctions are not so clear-cut; he is often tempted by a 
celebration of the subversive and creative madness, which was fashionable 
(think of the “antipsychiatry” of Laing and Cooper). Just like you, I find this 
formula on the “creative collapse” of Artaud quite astounding. And I have 
trouble following him when he distinguishes the vital “process” and the 
illness as “stopping” the process: there are also processes pathological, 
(self)destructive, deadly, which are better to try and stop… To understand 
what is at play here, the passage from Logic of Sense which you reference is 
very important. Deleuze opposes the “language of the surface” of Carroll with 
that of Artaud, the explorer of depths. In the language of Artaud, he said, “we 
recognize sorrow: it is the language of schizophrenia.” The first appearance 
of this notion in his work refers to a sort of disaster, the return to a 
“bankruptcy of the surface”… It is this diagnostic which leads Deleuze to 
bring Artaud’s writing closer to that of Wolfson, a schizophrenic in the clinical 
sense. Thus follows the admirable analysis on the different figures of the 
schizo body (this is where we find the first reference to the “body without 
organs”) and what characterizes the “schizophrenic language.” I recall a trait 
that Deleuze emphasizes strongly: a language without articulation. In Artaud’s 
glossolalia, “the cries together are welded into breath,” just as the parts of the 
schizo body become fluid and merge into a “glorious body without organs.” 
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But nothing is more disputable. If he takes the syntax that divides language 
as the anatomy that separates the body, Artaud does not oppose them in an 
indifferent fusion, but in an other articulation, rhythmic and mobile. He read 
the glossolalias aloud just enough to hear their rhythmic scansions which 
operate each time there are cuts in the fluidity of breath. The analogy with the 
body without organs does not hold—moreover, I do not think that the 
language of Artaud is “cut into the depths of the body,” that it immediately 
arises from the body’s passions and affects, as if schizophrenia was able (by 
what miracle?) to abolish any demarcation between the word and the thing, 
the language and the body. Many have dreamed about it, from the Cratylus to 
Rousseau, and beyond… Artaud is not one of them. You have yourself shown 
that his glossolalia have nothing to do with a “primitive language” of the 
body, but rather that they are built through a strategy of writing, by means of 
anagrams, of graphic and etymological derivations.5 Often, these are code 
words, variations on the phonemes of the name “Artaud,” the name that had 
been erased, foreclosed by psychosis, and which he tries to reclaim in the 
matrices of his writing. Without doubt, the subject’s relation to the Name of 
the Father is more essential than Deleuze thought… Adorno said of the 
syntactic ruptures we find in Hölderlin: “poetry took them to the zone of 
madness.” I could say as much of what Artaud called his “invented syllables” 
and all these seemingly delusional utterances that dot his final texts. These are 
diversions which allow him to replay the madness, to reinscribe it in the poem, 
to better outwit it. Deleuze treats these poetic inventions as simple clinical 
symptoms: he confounds the poet and the schizo, Artaud’s struggle against 
madness and the pathological elaborations of Wolfson. We blame him, and he 
defends himself in Anti-Oedipus. There, he reaffirms that Artaud is 
“schizophrenic,” but now celebrates the “schizophrenic process” as the most 
radical “breakthrough,” the most subversive and originary desire. I wonder 
if we are not dealing with a headlong rush, an escalation which further 
aggravates the initial mistake. 
 
E. GROSSMAN : Any antipsychiatry aside (and on this point, I agree with 
you), it seems that Deleuze is also part of, while rethinking, this very old 
tradition of delirium lent to poets. Levinas, too, evokes this tradition when, in 
Totality and Infinity, he analyzes the delirium of the the Phaedrus: the essence 
divine or not, the voice inspired by delirium is not necessarily irrational, he 
says; he here means the end of solitary thought or interiority. In an idea not 
too far from Deleuze’s, Levinas questions in Artaud, as in other writers, what 
makes him leave his language, that which makes him hear, at the interior of 
his language, always at least one other language (blown by another, as 
Derrida also heard from Artaud). Inspiration is not the only question here, but 
also that strangeness to oneself that makes one write—the question, central to 
Deleuze, of the translation; I will perhaps come back to this. Yet you have 
E v e l y n e  G r o s s m a n  &  J a c o b  R o g o z i n s k i  |  5  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXVII, No 1 (2019)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2019.847 
reason, in my view, to wonder about the report (or not) between the schizo in 
the Deleuzian sense and the psychiatric sense. It might be necessary to say the 
psychiatrics’ (plural) senses are so vague, contradictory, and shifting from the 
old Bleulerian concept to the modern DSM IV (a largely disputed 
categorization itself). So, admittedly, Deleuze uses this notion strangely, with 
little respect for the categories used by psychiatry (the psychiatries), and this 
lends itself to confusion. We could refer here to what he says about the 
meeting of ideas, flight, capturing the thoughts of the philosopher. So he steals 
this word from psychiatry, and of course it is surprising to speak of 
“Beckettian schizoid sequences” for example (Anti-Oedipus), or the 
“schizophrenic vocation of American literature” in the sense that it would 
make the English language scatter through drifts and derivations (Essays 
Critical and Clinical). We could also say that Deleuze is doing the work of 
creation (in the sense that, as we know, the philosopher is first and foremost 
for him a creator of concepts) and therefore for all of DSM IV, we would not 
give a page of Anti-Oedipus. Or, again, we could follow the text’s internal logic 
and simply accept the term as indissociably philosophical and poetic, as 
Deleuze and Guattari lay out. As an aside, we could also show how Deleuze 
and Guattari play on anagrammatic echoes between “schizo” and “rhizome” 
in A Thousand Plateaus (there is a poeticity to their writing, as in unison with 
what they are trying to grasp they continue the lines and detours that are also 
lines of writing: “We write like a rat and draw like a line,” says Deleuze 
strongly). 
To this extent, one can only be struck by the fact that “schizophrenia,” in 
Deleuze’s sense, is first of all a question that touches on language (and how, 
through language, schizophrenia relates the body to space, the journey, the 
lines…). “Psychosis is inseparable from a variable linguistic process,” he 
repeats, among other similar lines, in Essays Critical and Clinical. In this sense, 
if the comparison between Wolfson, Roussel, Brisset and Artaud comes back 
regularly in Deleuze, it is to try and comprehend how they tackle language 
and its transformation. Now, and I wonder if you have the same impression 
as me, you cannot be struck by the fact that Artaud’s work, read by Deleuze(-
Guattari), is often unrecognizable. He does not read Artaud like Derrida, for 
instance, in the sense of a tight, precise, and almost linguistic commentary on 
the text. Even the analyses of Logic of Sense are often a brilliant survey of the 
heterogenous fragments just mentioned (such as his translation of Carroll, a 
rapid allusion to “organ-letters” in the Tarahumaras, two phrases from 
November 1947). 
 
J. ROGOZINSKI : Difference of style, of tempo… While Derrida patiently 
follows every meandering of the texts, Deleuze flies over them at high speed 
by connecting them to other texts. This produces brilliant short-circuits, but 
the author is often unrecognized. This is how he invented the myth of Artaud-
the-Schizo, which has become an obstacle to reading. On the relationship 
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between poetry and delirium, you’re right to mention Plato, even if he is more 
devious than we believe. Reread the Ion: the poet is delirious, but the 
philosopher is not, because he speaks in truth, in the name of truth. By 
pretending to praise them, Plato wants to belittle the pretentions of the poets 
by rejecting them in madness, that is to say, in non-truth. This is the kind of 
exclusion that Artaud attacks when he attacks psychiatric pseudo-knowledge. 
He discovered that there is a truth of madness, a dangerous truth, infinitely 
exposed—madness, he said, is “Truth or death”6—but he learned, from 
having endured in its flesh, that it is also a counter-truth, an illusion, a “force 
of death” which opposes at the birth of the poem. Illusion in the sense that his 
own word seems to him “breathed” (at once dictated and stolen) by an evil 
Other. It is this knot of truth and counter-truth which is completely obscured 
when one apologizes for delirium or schizophrenia. One wonders why 
Deleuze privileges schizophrenia over other types of madness: why he 
implies a “schizo,” a dissociation, a dissolution of the ego, and considers the 
ego as an illusion that must be foiled. He shares what I designate as a position 
of egocide with many contemporaries: Heidegger, Sartre, Lacan… What 
makes the Deleuzian egocide special is that he is not content with a theoretical 
critique, but calls for a real process—the famous “schizophrenic process”—to 
“undo one’s self.” Already in Logic of Sense or Difference and Repetition, he  
defines the transcendental field as a network of preindividualized 
singularities “which does not involve either Me or I.” He then designates an 
“ante-me” which generates the self as a derivative instance, through a process 
of individuation.7 The problem is that he cannot really show how a concrete 
self, as a determined individual, emerges from this impersonal field. The 
process of individuation that he describes is only for a “vague” me, on the 
model of the “vague Adam” of Leibniz, where Adam = X, defined by the 
minimum predicates necessary to belong to the maximum of possible worlds, 
to the greatest number of variants of the same history.8 But this indeterminate 
point-X is not the singular self that I am, that we are each time. No doubt 
because it is impossible to constitute the ego from a native non-me: the ante-I 
must already be an I. This is why I think it necessary to return to Descartes, to 
determine the ego cogito as a first truth that gives itself. However, Deleuze goes 
completely in the opposite direction, as in Anti-Oedipus he rejects any ego, any 
personal individuality as an illusion “excessively” paranoid, contrasting it 
with the anonymous flow of desire. We then pass from the ante-I to the anti-
I. By becoming radicalized, the removal of the ego is transformed into pure 
and simple destruction. We then meet the aporia at which every egocide 
becomes radical: is it possible to totally eliminate the ego? Do we not find, at 
the heart of delirium, an irreducible halting of saying-I? There is a surprising 
passage at the beginning of Anti-Oedipus, where Deleuze and Guattari claim 
that delusions and hallucinations “presuppose an I sense more deeply,” “an ‘I 
sense that I become a woman,” “that I become god” which is neither delirious 
nor hallucinatory” (p. 25). But this track will not be explored. They will insist 
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that “there is no self in the center” of the field (p. 105)—even when Nietzsche 
declares, at the moment of collapse, that “all names in history are me,” even 
when the Mômo writes “I am Antonin Artaud, I am my father, my mother, 
my son/and me.” It is the enigma of this “and me” that it is time to question. 
When Artaud emerges from delirium and returns to writing, in Rodez in 1943, 
he says that he strives to “clear (his) true me” and returns to signing his own 
name. He will describe his experience later as the fall into a “gulf without 
name,” that of madness, followed by a rise, a re-naming that will leave “the 
gulf between the syllables of the term: AR-TAU.” As if he already knew what 
misunderstanding would distort the sense, he added that “some insiders have 
wanted to argue that this was a designation of force and not of an 
individual”—and he responds in advance to all the egocides superbly: “Now, 
I am this individual. I am, me, this dark force.”9 If he presents madness as a 
“transplantation without essence” where the outside and the inside, the self 
and the other, are at risk of being confused10, it is for him opposed to his 
“intransplantable me,” a me which would have falsely believed that it was, 
entered and devoured by the “larvae of the non-me,” while he did not cease 
to be. It is this affirmation which underlies the most paradoxical, the most 
“mad” declarations of his last writings—“I always knew that I was Artaud 
the dead,” “it is I who am appointed God, me, Artaud”… That he reenacts the 
paradoxes of Valdemar for Poe (“I tell you that I am dead”); which he 
identifies as his proper name in the Name of all names; or that he 
simultaneously occupies all the places of his family tree—in each case there 
re-emerges the one irreducible I. Leaving open the question of which could be 
that “me” capable of multiplying, getting spread infinitely, of adopting or 
simulating innumerable identities, without ever ceasing to be me… 
 
E. GROSSMAN : I was always struck by this sentence, apparently so casual, 
from A Thousand Plateaus: “For  Heliogabalus, it is Spinoza, and Spinoza is 
Heliogabalus revived. And the Tarahumaras are the experimentation, the 
peyote. Spinoza, Heliogabalus, and experimentation have the same 
formula…”11 (Massumi trans.).  At first glance, one has the impression of 
being a little electrified, or, like you said, of flying over these references at a 
high speed. And still, in the comic violence of these equivalences (never forget 
the humor of Deleuze, or his taste for nonsense), in what seems to be a series 
of incongruous comparisons, something is expressed of the One and the 
many, of the question of the plane of immanence, of the speed in-between tiny 
particles… (it is the reading which Deleuze also made ten years earlier in his 
Spinoza work). François Zourabichvili was right to press on the importance of 
the violence in thinking for Deleuze. In Proust and Signs as in Difference and 
Repetition, Deleuze keeps returning to the fact that there is no thought that is 
involuntary, born by breaking through, dependent on an accidental event 
with something that arises from the outside and forces us to think (including, 
for example, the apparent nonsense, the discordant idea). It is not certain, 
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writes Deleuze in Difference and Repetition, that thought “can be reported, as 
in the Cartesian cogito, to a substantial and complete subject, well-constituted: 
the thought is plural and its terrible movements cannot be supported under 
only the conditions of a larval subject” (p. 156). This, Deleuze reads of Proust 
but also of Artaud, in a way even more critical, it seems to me, and in 
particular in the first texts like the Correspondence with Jacques Rivière. What 
does he finally find among these writers he loves? Another modality of 
thought which no longer belongs to our systems of representation (a thought 
without image, that’s what Artaud would have met, he suggests), an enemy 
thought (not a thought “which does no harm to anyone,” and not a 
philosophy, he says drolly, but a “misosophy”), a thought which no longer 
refers to common sense, established values, to the recognition or the reunion 
of the meaning which brings out the new, which is a work of creation (that is 
why for him the thinker, the philosopher, is a creator, close to the artist): 
“Because the new thing, that is to say the difference, is to solicit in thinking 
forces which are not those of recognition, neither today nor tomorrow, but are 
powers of a completely different model, in a terra incognita, never recognized 
nor recognizable. And from what forces does it come into thought, from what 
bad nature and what bad central will, from which central collapse that strips 
thought of its ‘innateness,’ and which treats time as something that has not 
always existed, but that begins, constrained and forced?” (DR, 177-178; 
Grossman’s emphasis). 
I was wondering earlier on about this curious formula from Deleuze in 
Logic of Sense, evoking Artaud, “a collapse central and creative” (an expression 
which implicitly refers to that complaint of Artaud in his letters to Rivière on 
a “central collapse of the soul”). But the formula we find here emphasizes this 
complex link between the loss of self-control, rational restraint, and creative 
thinking. Deleuze, moreover, remarks that he is absolutely faithful here to the 
analysis which Foucault gives in his History of Madness. You were alluding to 
it yourself at the beginning, when you quote what you call “the maxim” of 
Foucault: madness is the absence of work, the point of collapse where it becomes 
possible. But we cannot, I believe, stop at this categorical formula of a subtle 
analysis of Foucault (and therefore, of Deleuze), its undeniable grandeur in 
the final pages of A History of Madness, because we must read this text until 
the end. What does Foucault say in these final lines? That from now on, it is 
the world that must try to measure itself “to the disproportion of Nietzsche, 
of Van Gogh, of Artaud. And nothing in him, least of all what he can know of 
madness, assures him that these works of madness justify it” (author’s 
emphasis). Between the absence of the work and the works of madness, that 
pounding, that preserved chiasm, is the full complexity of Foucault’s thought 
which we must understand. The madness is breaking and it is this enigma that 
we are invited to confront. Then, Artaud as read by Deleuze and Guattari, is 
certainly unrecognizable, as I mentioned earlier… One doesn’t recognize him 
at times (he is no longer like himself, who we think we know, in which we 
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sometimes think we recognize each other), since it is not reading by recognition 
or by self-reflection. To measure the excessiveness of these works, as Foucault 
said, try to hear their strangeness and their enigmatic character without 
falling back on what we think we know about ourselves and about bodies. 
Recall Deleuze’s mockery of the acts of recognition that occupy us in our 
everyday lives. He wrote, “it’s a table, it’s an apple; it’s the piece of wax, hello 
Theatetus” (DR, 176). Nothing to do, indeed, with “Heliogabal, it is 
Spinoza…”! We unfortunately don’t have enough time here to continue the 
discussion that your theory of egocides deserves; I am referring to your 
book1212 and will list a few conflicting ideas (while recognizing that we still 
agree on many fundamental points). To begin by paying tribute to Deleuze-
Guattari, this strange subject without an ego may have been insufficiently taken 
stock of here. You also suggest that Deleuze (like Levinas, Derrida, Lacan, 
Foucault, Blanchot…) searched for our greatest happiness in the joy of 
dissociation, in losing ourselves to writing and to thought: there is a stratified 
and deadly schizo, another who is cheerful and creative, he suggests. It seems 
to me that what Deleuze is trying to invent (with others), is a non-personal 
subject which clears away the anxiety of being—a sense of relief, 
appeasement, and infinite joy at times: I am a temporary particle inserted into 
an unstable ensemble, or I am this multitude of voices speaking in me, or I am 
that which does not return or refer to itself, this “myself” stabilizes on the 
affirmation of identity. So finally I write, I think—out of me. This is probably 
what gives the reading of many texts of the twentieth century: subjectivities 
in constant displacement, without a fixed point of enunciation, “an I without 
me” said Blanchot, “the splendor of One” adds Deleuze (a nonpersonal 
individuation), a Neutral, a non-person. No madness of the absence of 
identity or paralysis is a subject without images, but the game of a gap 
between I and me, a preserved openness, the movement, this “free play of 
articulations” which Artaud admires among Balinese dancers. 
 
J. ROGOZINSKI : This “cheerful and creative schizo,” this “joy of 
dissociation” where all anxiety would vanish, I do not find them in Artaud 
when he invokes his test of madness: he speaks of the agonies of death “where 
the I falls into a puddle.” I do not find these in the final silence of Nietzsche, 
in the suicide of Nerval or that of Sarah Kane, in the automutilations of David 
Nebreda, not to mention all those countless, anonymous people who have not 
managed to to tear themselves away from the silence of the absence of work. 
If Artaud had lived long enough for Anti-Oedipus, he would have no doubt 
ranked it among the writings “of surface,” those which do not come pre-
packaged, but “that the author was careful to maintain in the womb of 
suffering where all the great poets have suffered.”13 You are right, there is a 
difference between us—and the question of the ego is at stake. I am surprised 
that a philosopher of the caliber of Deleuze could commit such a 
misinterpretation of Descartes. The Cartesian cogito is not this “completed 
1 0  |  A  C o n v e r s a t i o n  b e t w e e n  E v e l y n e  G r o s s m a n  &  J a c o b  
R o g o z i n s k i  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXVII, No 1 (2019)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2019.847 
subject, well-constituted” which he rejects. It is an intermittent and precarious 
self, which cannot find itself, failing to persist from one instant to another: a 
me without subjectivity, without fixed identity, that which is not the same thing 
as an “I without me” (with all due respect to Blanchot, this expression has 
about as much sense as a square circle!). Our experience confirms this 
intuition of Descartes: it is this incessant failure which exposes us to the risk 
of dispersion, dissolution into the anonymity of the We, the Neuter, and 
alienates us to the different figures of the Other. This is what we must resist, 
in all forces of “conspiracy” (to talk like Artaud) which tend to alienate the 
ego, to dissociate itself from itself, to crush its singularity. The authors which 
you invoke have not grasped the stakes involved in this resistance, in this 
fight for the truth of the ego. Levinas, Lacan, Foucault, but also Heidegger or 
Bataille… These thinkers which I admire, whom I often feel so close to, 
everyone has restated in one manner or another the same gesture of egocide, 
except for Derrida. At home, egocide is accompanied by an inverse gesture, 
by an insisted re-mark and signature, as I tried to show elsewhere.14 
To return to Deleuze, there is a motif which we have not talked about yet 
and which plays a decisive role in his reading (or rather his non-reading) of 
Artaud: the “body without organs.” Deleuze renders the “body without 
organs” as a weapon of war against the ego: “let’s go even further, we have 
not yet found our body without organs, not enough to undo ourselves.”15 We 
are very far from the furious reaffirmation of the “Me Antonin Artaud” which 
scans all of the final writings… But what poses the biggest problem to me is 
the negative, or privative, nature of this concept, which inevitably evokes a 
compact mass, without any differentiation. I believe that this stems from his 
initial misunderstanding of the so-called “schizo language” of Artaud. Since 
Deleuze mistakenly interprets it as a continuous flux, an inarticulate “block 
of breath,” he constructs the body without organs by analogy as a continuum 
without cuts, an “undifferentiated amorphous fluid,” that is to say a full body, 
closed on itself, sterile and dead.16 Here, too, we are far from Artaud: the 
Mômo is looking for a “true body” which would escape the rigid divisions of 
the organism; but this new body, re-engendered through the poem, supposes 
a “furtive anatomy,” a movable articulation between differentiated elements. 
The “body without organs” is not appropriate to name this, unless distorted 
to the extreme as in A Thousand Plateaus, where it now seems to have a teeming 
multitude of organs (but in what sense is it still a body without organs?…). 
That is why I prefer to talk about flesh, a self always incarnated, of a flesh that 
always is, as Husserl said, an Ichleib, an “ego-flesh.” This is also a term we find 
in Artaud, for example at the beginning of Van Gogh, where he raises the 
question of the relationship between the flesh and the body, as well as the 
flesh and the ego. But Deleuze was interested in egocide (and also hostile to 
phenomenology), in admitting of an immanent self who is his own flesh. It is 
not a question of words, but fundamentally an alternative: it is necessary to 
choose between ego-flesh and a body without organs without “me.” Flesh has 
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nothing to do with the compact mass described in Anti-Oedipus—it is, says 
Merleau-Ponty, an “inwardly worked mass,” traversed by a “hiatus,” a 
“dehiscence.” This is the “free play of articulations” which Artaud spoke 
about. Because it is a matter of stepping over this gap, of intertwining the 
disjointed poles of the ego-flesh, the matrix of this chiasm is tactile (where my 
hand touches my other hand touching). In their last book, Deleuze and 
Guattari jest about the chiasm: about paintings, they write “the difficult thing 
is to attach, not the hands, but the planes.”17 My response to them is that 
without this carnal interlacing, it is impossible to join the planes, aesthetically, 
ontologically—impossible to articulate immanence and transcendence, to 
understand the passage from flesh to body, from me to the subject, from life 
to the world and to being. Deleuze claimed a philosophy of absolute 
immanence: he envisaged the appearance of transcendence in immanence 
only as a “poisoned gift”, a deadly threat to the field of immanence.18 I 
wonder if this is not his most serious mistake, the major limit of his thought… 
 
E. GROSSMAN : To speak so peremptorily of misinterpretation, of initial 
misunderstanding, of a serious mistake by Deleuze, to brandish against him what 
is believed to be the ultimate truth of Artaud, Nietzsche, or the Ego, bothers 
me a little. It is obvious that there is a point where madness touches death. 
The question remains constant in Deleuze: how can we ensure that the 
delirium, the line of flight, is not confused with a pure and simple movement 
of self-destruction (the alcoholism of Fitzgerald, the discouragement of 
Lawrence, the suicide of Woolf, the sad end of Kerouac…). Artaud knew 
better than anyone else, and nobody denies it: do not go back. Is this a reason 
to confuse life and writing? If it were only a matter of an absence of work, of 
suffering, of psychotic collapse, then Artaud, Nerval, and Nietzsche would 
only be of interest to medicine; what matters to us, once again, is what 
Foucault rightly named the work of madness. Their self-pity toward their 
undeniable suffering teaches us nothing about the dazzlement that arises for 
us in their writing. The real question for me is this: why these torments, these 
fears, these collapses, this violent depersonalization which they experienced 
and wrote about, and which can also dazzle us and take us outside of 
ourselves, and give us an idea of the infinity of meaning that they sought to 
achieve? 
You know as well as I do that we have too often simplified and rigidified 
the statements of Artaud, seeking to make him the spokesperson for this or 
that epochal thesis. We must be wary, therefore, of our tendency to stabilize 
his writings. Support the dissociation, his place as a “creative schizo,” as I 
talked about. This implies being able to follow the vertiginous panic of his 
utterances as well as their shifting and unstable logics, and the apparent 
paradoxes which undo fixed identities—in short, all that Deleuze was able to 
understand and integrate with a subtle finesse. For example, I could, without 
much looking, find dozens of sentences that contradict those you quote on his 
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so-called me. There is no thesis in Artaud, no affirmation that doesn’t 
immediately reverse itself. Artaud’s challenge is to reinvent a syntax in 
motion that prevents the sense of taking, to get into a form; he disarticulates 
the sentence through internal discordance, destroying the logical functioning 
of the discursive connections it leaves in suspense. An example? “…my 
extreme consciousness not of me but of I, no, … I do not have me and it is not 
me, and it is no… because it is not me but I am here in his body.”19 
I do not know what the “body without organs” is. A body without a sex 
perhaps, a non-sexed and therefore fully sexual body, a body eternally alive 
(not the body doomed to the death of human reproduction), in perpetual, 
eruptive overflow, and which writes, which draws, which dances. Deleuze 
and Guattari’s “body without organs” is a great discovery which belongs to 
them: a connection of desires, of flux, of intensities. The one and the other are 
mysterious to me, totally inexplicable. I also love Deleuze’s praise of the 
enigmatic; he says it, for example, about the great Russian or American 
novels: at home, contrary to the psychological and rational tradition of French 
or English literature, things remain enigmatic and yet not arbitrary. It is as if 
things did not fear to respect what Melville called the “immense and 
terrifying void of the soul.” I love that in the philosophy of Deleuze we find 
this same respect for maintaining the enigmatic in writing, in thought, in 
science, in art… This is perhaps he invites us to continue thinking with him, 
with modesty and wonder. 
Translated by Adam Blair 
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